The Doha development agenda: what special and differential treatment? by Singh, Ajit
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The Doha development agenda: what
special and differential treatment?
Ajit Singh
University of Cambridge
9. September 2005
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/53438/
MPRA Paper No. 53438, posted 6. February 2014 14:27 UTC
 1 
September 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Doha Development Agenda: What Special and 
Differential Treatment? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ajit Singh 
Professor of Economics, Cambridge University 
Senior Fellow, Queens’ College, Cambridge, CB3 9ET 
Email:  Ajit.singh@econ.cam.ac.uk 
Fax:  + 44 1223 740479 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This paper is to be presented at the UNDP organised ‘Geneva Dialogue on Trade 
Policy’. It is based on Singh (2005) 
 
 2 
The Doha Development Agenda: What Special and Differential 
Treatment? 
 
 
I Doha Declaration and Special and Differential Treatment(S&DT) 
 
The concept of S&DT for developing countries represented an important advance in 
international economic law in the second half of the last century, for its recognition of the 
principle of non - reciprocity in international economic relations. This principle 
acknowledges that there are unequal playing fields between rich and poor countries and that it 
takes a long time to build up developing countries’ technical, financial and other capabilities, 
to name but a few areas where these countries are at an enormous disadvantage.  Although 
with the rise of neoliberalism, there was a retreat from an effective implementation of S&DT 
in the 1980s, the principle was nevertheless reaffirmed in the Uruguay Round Agreements.  
More importantly, at the 2001 Doha Ministerial Meeting, the final declaration handsomely   
re-endorsed the principle with language which leaves little doubt about the significance 
attached to the principle itself and to its applications.  Paragraph 44 of the Doha declaration 
states:    
“ We reaffirm the provisions for special and differential treatment are an integral 
part of the WTO Agreements. We note the concerns expressed regarding their 
operation in addressing specific constraints faced be developing countries, 
particularly least-developed countries. In that connection, we also note that some 
Members have proposed a Framework Agreement on Special and Differential 
Treatment (WT/GC/W/442). We therefore agree that all special and differential 
treatment provisions shall be reviewed with a view to strengthening then and 
making them more precise, effective and operational. In this connection, we endorse 
the work programme on special and differential treatment set out in the Decision on 
Implementation- related Issues and Concerns.”  
 
The relevant paragraph 12 of the Decision on Implementation-related Issues and Concerns 
provides: 
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 “ The Committee on Trade and Development is instructed: 
(i) to identify those special and differential treatment provisions that are 
already mandatory in nature and those that are non-binding in character, to 
consider the legal and practical implications for developed and developing 
Members of converting special and differential treatment measures into 
mandatory provisions, to identify those that Members consider should be 
made mandatory, and to report to the General Council with clear 
recommendations for a decision by July 2002; 
(ii) to examine additional ways in which special and differential treatment 
provisions can be made more effective, to consider ways, including 
improved information flows, in which developing countries, in particular the 
least-developed countries, may be assisted to make best use of special and 
differential treatment provisions and to report to the General Council with 
clear recommendations for a decision by July 2002; and 
(iii) to consider, in the context of the work programme adopted at the Fourth 
Session of the Ministerial Conference, how special and differential 
treatment may be incorporated into the architecture of WTO rules.” 
 
One might ask why the Doha Declaration was replete with such overwhelming endorsements 
of S&DT and the expressions of the need for developing countries to obtain developmental 
benefits from WTO trade and trade-related measures.  This focus on development can be 
interpreted as an inducement to gain developing country support for a new trade round, 
bearing in mind the cynicism and disappointment among these countries in relation to the 
Uruguay Round Agreements.  Hence the Doha Declaration suggested that in the proposed 
new round development concerns would be central.  The Declaration also made it abundantly 
clear that S&DT provisions are crucial if the Doha Development Agenda is to succeed
1
. 
 
The main purpose of this paper is to look afresh at the concept of S&DT and revisit its 
economic rationale in the current context of the world economy. Unlike many AC evaluations 
and studies which take a generally negative view of S&DT in terms of its benefits either to 
the DCs or to the multilateral trading system, this paper presents a rather different view. It 
                                                 
1
 There are other "S&DT-like" mandates in the Doha texts, expressed in a variety of S&DT or "pro-development 
language: for instance, paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health; paragraphs.16, 19, 
21, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 32, 33, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 51, plus the Decision on Implementation.  I am 
grateful to Werner Corrales and Manuela Tortora for this point. 
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acknowledges the failure of some current and previous approaches to S&DT but nevertheless 
it argues that the unqualified endorsement of S&DT by the ministers at Doha provides a basis 
for working towards realizing the inherent potential of S&DT for economic development.  
Specifically it is argued here that important impediments to economic development are 
represented by certain articles and clauses of the WTO Agreements themselves.  It is a 
strange irony that apart from all the normal structural reasons for seeking special and 
differential treatment, parts of the Agreements now constitute an important additional reason 
for seeking S&DT for DCs.  The paper suggests, however, that in order for it to meet the 
developmental needs of DCs, a fresh and broader conceptualization of S&DT would be 
required than is available under the current Agreements of the WTO.  It is further argued that 
this new S&DT conceptualization would not only be of benefit to developing countries but 
would also serve the long-term interests of developed countries. Such S&DT architecture 
would be Pareto optimal in the present and prospective circumstances of the world economy.   
 
Apart from its significance for developing countries, S&DT also provides an opportunity for 
the multilateral trading system to regain the necessary public legitimacy which it has 
evidently lost in the recent period (Ricupero 2000).  For this to happen, the fresh thinking on 
these issues should aim to bring to the forefront the overarching environmental and 
developmental goals of the multilateral trading system.  
 
The Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization states at the very outset:  
 The Parties to this Agreement, 
‘Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should 
be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and 
a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, and 
expanding the production of and trade in goods, and services, while allowing for the 
optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable 
development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance 
the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and 
concerns at different levels of economic development. (WTO 1995) 
 
The above passage may be regarded as being effectively the mission statement of the WTO. 
The restoration of public confidence of the civil society in the organization will only come if 
is seen to be actively engaged in fulfilling is own laudable mission objectives. 
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II Lack of Progress since Doha 
 
Since Doha, there has been very little progress from the point of view of developing countries 
on the Doha Development agenda. Most deadlines for agreement on S&DT measures were 
missed and of the nearly 100 proposals put forward on this matter, by developing countries 
there was agreement on only five of them in a watered-down form. Of the five one on the 
monetary mechanism for S&DT provisions is being interpreted in diametrically opposite 
ways by rich and poor countries. Three of the five concern least developed countries and the 
fifth was a non-mandatory request for technical assistance to implement TRIPS. Melamed 
(2003) sums up the state of discussions on S&DT during the last year as follows: ‘The story 
of the first year of the Doha negotiating agenda has not covered the WTO with glory. 
Procedural tricks, a lack of willingness to discuss key issues, the breakdown of trust between 
delegations and the extremely slow pace of discussions have all shown how much work 
remains to put the development in the ‘development round’. 
 
However, after the Cancun debacle there appears to have been some progress on the matter.  
Zoellick, the US trade representative, in his recent letter (January 11, 2004) to other trade 
ministers regarding the resumption of Doha negotiations, observes that there is “a general 
interest in advancing the Doha Development Agenda, and even a sense that our struggles at 
Cancun may have laid some useful foundations.”  However, even he recognises that, in order 
for development objectives to be seen to be taken seriously, “…we will of course need to 
incorporate special and differential treatment, recognising that developing countries face 
varying circumstances, additional challenges from global competition, and particularly 
sensitive adjustment problems.” 
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Despite this procedural progress, there are deep underlying differences between developing 
countries (DCs) and advanced countries (ACs) on the interpretation of S&DT, as well as on 
the entire Doha Development Agenda.  The following sections provide a critical analysis of 
the main issues between the two sides. 
 
III The Multilateral Trading System And Economic Development: 
Alternative Analyses 
 
a. The Affirmative Case 
 
A central analytical issue raised by the discussion so far of S&DT, the developmental 
objectives of the Doha Round as well as the Preambular paragraph of the WTO Agreements, 
is to what extent, if any, the multilateral trading system in its current form promotes or 
hinders economic development.  The AC proponents of the WTO suggest that trade 
liberalization and integration into the world economy is the best way for DCs to achieve 
economic development, and this is exactly the path the multilateral trading system of the 
WTO has been following. 
 
The WTO adherents, which includes not only the IFIs and other influential globalizers, 
normally support their case with the following kinds of subsidiary arguments:
2
 
 
 The rate of growth of world trade has been twice the rate of production in the post-war 
period and that trade is therefore the engine of growth; 
 The failure of the Soviet Union indicates that dirigiste policies are inappropriate; 
 On the positive side, the experiences of Japan and East Asia indicate that export 
orientation, greater openness and integration with the world economy are the best 
means of achieving fast and equitable economic growth. 
 
It is further suggested that developing countries would be better off abandoning S&DT 
altogether and integrating themselves quickly into the international economy.  S&DT is 
                                                 
2
 The classic reference here is Sachs and Warner(1995).  For more recent studies see Prowse (2002) and 
Hoekman et.al (2003). See also Srinivasan and Bhagwati (1999) and Rodrik (1999). 
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regarded as being ineffective and, in any case, is likely to delay the necessary market-oriented 
pro-competition economic reforms that are necessary.  Essentially, the basic development 
philosophy of the WTO consists of two main elements:  (a) trade liberalization and greater 
integration with the world economy; (b) increasing the role of the market and diminishing 
that of the state (as exemplified by TRIMS, abolition of state aid to subsidize industry, etc). 
 
Thus, the case of the proponents of WTO and its current policies is multi-faceted and 
seemingly formidable.  However, on close examination, it will be seen to be deeply flawed.  
The readers will recognize that the above line of reasoning is enshrined in the Washington 
Consensus which in recent years has lost much of its lustre and is being rapidly abandoned 
even by former adherents.   
 
Nevertheless, in view of the hold of these arguments in influential circles in the WTO and 
elsewhere, these will be fully reviewed here in the light of the latest available research.  It 
will be suggested that trade liberalization and globalization are far from being the best ways, 
let alone the only ways, of promoting economic development. From the perspective of 
economic development there is an optimal degree of openness for each country which does 
not necessarily coincide with either free trade or with free capital movements, and it is 
proposed that each country should have policy autonomy to choose its optimal level of 
openness.  Indeed the intellectual case for suitably crafted S&DT for every country at its own 
level of development and its specific circumstances is overwhelming. These propositions and 
proposals are systematically examined in the following sections. 
 
b. Theoretical considerations.
3
 
 
The traditional case for free trade can best be put in terms of the two fundamental theorems 
of welfare economics.  According to the first welfare theorem, a competitive equilibrium in 
the absence of externalities and non-satiation constitutes a Pareto optimum.  The second 
theorem, which is more relevant for present purposes, states that any Pareto optimum can be 
realized as a competitive equilibrium in the presence of all-around convexity, provided 
suitable lump-sum transfers can be arranged among the participants.  Most of these 
                                                 
3
 This section draws on Chakravarty and Singh (1988). 
 8 
assumptions are unrealistic in relation to the real world that does not always display all-
around convexity and where externalities do matter.
4
 Nevertheless, neo-classical economists 
suggest that such considerations do not destroy the case for free trade but only change the 
nature of the argument. Thus, Krugman (1987) concludes his classic defense of free trade in 
terms of modern theory as follows: "this is not the argument that free trade is optimal because 
markets are efficient.  Instead it is a sadder but wiser argument for free trade as a rule of 
thumb in a world whose politics are as imperfect as its markets."   
 
However, as Chakravarty and Singh (1988) suggest, the politics of a world of increasing 
returns to scale are more likely to make it gravitate towards ‘managed’ rather than free trade.  
Instead of either free trade or autarchy, this would be a world in between – one in which there 
were trade restrictions, government assistance to favoured industries and a plethora of special 
arrangements between countries, in other words, the messy real world.  In place of all-around 
convexity, this real world is characterized by learning by doing (Arrow, 1962), dynamic 
economies and cumulative causation (Young, 1928; Kaldor 1978).  This is, therefore, the 
world of second best and of multiple equilibria and the purpose of policy is to move from a 
bad to a good equilibrium.  The gains from such policy intervention have, however, to be 
balanced against the losses from government failure and appropriate policy can therefore be 
prescribed only on a case-by-case basis (Ocampo and Taylor, 2000; Gomery and Baumol, 
2000).  Provided there is a mechanism for ensuring full employment of each nation’s 
resources so that there are gains from trade to be realized, and if we abstract, for the moment, 
from the possibility of government failure, Chakravarty and Singh suggest that a policy of 
selective economic openness may be a source of great advantage for an economy for any one 
of the following reasons:
5
    
 
                                                 
4
 The traditional theory of comparative advantage assumes, inter alia, constant or decreasing returns to scale and 
full employment.  There is, however, considerable evidence in the real world of increasing returns arising from 
the static, Kaldor’s dynamic and Young’s macro-economic economies of scale as well as of widespread 
externalities.  The ‘new’ trade theory’s response to these problems has been, as Ocampo and Taylor (2000) put 
it “to muffle the impact of scale economies by ‘convexifying’ assumptions”.  They note, for example the “Dixit 
and Stiglitz (1977) model of monopolistic competition in which firms’ profitability gains from returns to scale 
are strictly limited by consumers’ desires for product diversity.” 
5
   Such a mechanism, for example, existed in the “Golden Age” of the post-WWII era (1950-1973) when, under 
the aegis of a single hegemonic economic power, namely the U.S., European economies were able to maintain 
high levels of aggregate demand to ensure full employment (Glyn et al., 1990; Singh, 1995a). 
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(a) it may enable a country to concentrate its relatively specialized resources in areas of 
production where the world demand is highly income and price elastic; 
(b) it may lead to diffusion of knowledge of a nature which can lead to considerable 
upgradation of the quality of local factors of production; 
(c) it may lead to sufficient competitive pressure to eliminate X-inefficiency; 
(d) trade may lead to changes in the distribution of income which can lead to a greater share 
of accumulation in national income; 
(e) trade may facilitate what Schumpeter stressed so much: an accelerated process of 
creative destruction. 
 
In general, such trade openness works positively if the phenomenon of "learning" from 
contacts with the rest of the world are institutionalized through suitable adaptations on the 
policy side involving appropriate government interventions which make the domestic 
economy more responsive to change.  This is a main lesson that emerges from the 
outstanding industrial success of East Asian economies during the second half of the 20
th
 
century as we shall see in the next section.
6
   
 
To sum up, while neoclassical arguments for "free trade" suffer from serious conceptual and 
operational difficulties, there are indeed substantive benefits from selective trade or economic 
openness, which are more robust than the traditional neoclassical theory suggests.  However, 
such benefits can be realized only in a world in which there is full employment in all trading 
nations, coupled with an appropriate set of domestic policies which go considerably beyond 
the limits of commercial policy as traditionally defined.   
 
IV Strategic versus close integration with the World Economy and the market 
friendly approach to development 
 
a. The East Asian Experience 
 
It used to be customary for International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and orthodox 
economists to ascribe East Asia’s outstanding economic success during the last four decades 
                                                 
6
 See further Freeman (1989); Chang  (1994); Singh (1995b), Amsden (2001). 
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to (a) their close integration with the world economy;  (b) competition and economic 
efficiency; (c) to government’s market friendly approach which suggested that the 
government intervened in these countries sparingly, only to provide infrastructure and human 
capital for private enterprise to flourish. The export success of East Asian countries 
underlined their competitiveness. Overall, in the IFI’s view, the experience of these countries 
is thought to show how orthodox economic policies can bring fast GDP growth.
7
 
 
Recently, the IFIs have re-evaluated their analysis of East Asian success in the wake of the 
Asian crisis. Their new conclusion is that that the crisis was caused in part by too much 
government intervention in these economies and by the lack of competition which led to over 
investment, collapse of profits and ultimately to the crisis.
8
 
 
The above version of the IFI’s East Asian analysis is comprehensively rejected by 
independent scholars. The broad consensus view is that the governments in East Asian 
countries did not intervene reluctantly or sparingly but followed a vigorous industrial policy 
by which they attempted to change the vectors of prices and costs facing enterprises in the 
direction desired by the planners.  The government intervened not only at the broad sectoral 
levels but also at the level of the individual firm, favoring companies which accepted its 
strategic plans.  These interventions were normally carried out by the so-called administrative 
guidance rather than explicit legislation.
9
 
 
To make the discussion more specific, the instruments of industrial and export promotion 
policies used either by Japan or by the Republic of Korea during their periods of rapid 
economic growth – the former country from 1950 to 1973 and the latter during the 1960s and 
the 1970s – can be summed up as follows:10 
 
 Export Promotion and import restriction: 
                                                 
7
 The classic references here are World Bank (1991,1993) 
8
 See IMF (1997); Summers (1998). For differing perspectives on the causes, consequences and remedies of the 
financial crisis in East Asian countries, see three recent collections of araticles published by National Bureau of 
Economic Research:  Feldstein (2002), Dooley and Frankel (2002), Edwards and Frankel (2002). 
 
9
 See Singh(1994,1997,1998); Amsden(1994); Lall(1995);Singh and Weisse(1999). 
10
 For information on Japan, see, among others, Okimoto (1989), Tsuru (1993); Caves and Uekusa (1976).  For 
the Republic of Korea see Amsden (1989), Chang (1994); Singh (1998) 
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(i) Import restrictions, both general and specific; 
(ii) Favouring particular sectors for export promotion and in some cases 
particular firms for that purpose; 
(iii) Seeking compliance for subsidies given to exporters by means of export 
targets for specific firms (the Korean case); 
(iv) Interest rate subsidies and the availability of credit and foreign exchange to 
favoured firms that meet export targets; 
(v) General export promotion, in Japan through JETRO (Japan Export Trade 
Promotion Organization) and in the Republic of Korea via KOTRA 
(Korean Trade Promotion Organization); 
(vi) Provision of infrastructure, including human capital, in support of exports; 
(vii) Taxation relief on imported inputs and on R & D expenditures; 
(viii) Allowing favoured conglomerates to import capital goods and foreign 
technology and to raise cheaper finance on international markets. 
 
Industrial policy measures 
 
(i) Lax enforcement of competition policy, including the extensive use of 
cartels;
11
 
(ii) Government creation and promotion of conglomerates (in the Republic of 
Korea);
12
 
(iii) Tax concessions to corporations to increase investment; 
(iv) Promotion of a close, long-term relationship between finance and industry 
which was critical to the implementation of the industrial policy;
13
 
(v) Labour repression to ensure labour peace in a period of gigantic structural 
change (this applies to Korea rather than to Japan);
14
 
                                                 
11
 See further Amsden and Singh (1994). 
12
 See Chang (1994). 
13
 Johnson et al. (1989). 
14
 In the postwar period, Japan has cultivated an enterprise-based, in-house approach to labour unions, which has 
contributed to industrial peace.  See further You and Chang (1993). 
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(vi) Establishment of state industries to enhance industrial development (this 
again applies to the Republic of Korea rather than to Japan); 
(vii) Administrative guidance, used extensively in both countries. 
 
 Clearly, many of the above policies are prima facie in violation of the WTO Agreements, 
particularly in the areas of TRIMS, subsidies, and technology policy (TRIPS). It may, 
however, be argued that such policies had been implemented by many countries in Latin 
America as well but they have not been successful. This is clearly an important issue and will 
be taken up in Section VI below. 
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Table 2: Import-penetration in manufactures in advanced industrial countries: 1961-
1979.  
(Ratio of manufactured imports to GNP) 
 
     1961 1965 1969 1973 1979 
 
United States of America 1.5 2.1 3.4 4.0 4.5 
United Kingdom  4.6 6.7 8.0 11.7 14.2 
Rest of EEC (9)  6.1 7.6 10.1 13.0 15.8 
Japan    1.8 1.5 2.2 3.0 2.4 
 
Source: CEPG (1979) 
 
Apart from industrial policy, it is important to emphasize, in the context of this paper, that the 
East Asian countries, contrary to the IFI view, did not have a close integration with the world 
economy. Rather, the degree of their integration can be regarded as being strategic but not 
close. Thus these countries had export-orientation but they extensively used selective as well 
as comprehensive import controls during the course of industrialization.  As Table 2 shows, 
as late as 1979 when Japan had been a member of OECD for nearly a decade and was 
therefore committed to more or less free trade, its manufactured imports as a proportion of 
GDP were just over two per cent.  The corresponding imports of European countries were 
several orders of magnitude higher.  Even the United States which, because of its continental 
size, has traditionally been relatively closed, had manufacturing imports nearly twice as high 
as those of Japan, relative to the respective GDPs in the two countries.  Clearly, Japan was 
using informal methods of controlling imports even well after it had become a leading world 
exporter of a whole range of manufacture products including cars and electronic goods of 
various kinds.
15
  Similarly, South Korea afforded protection to its fledgling car industry for 
nearly three decades, to reach a stage where it too became a major exporter of cars. 
                                                 
15
 It is not unreasonable to infer informal import controls (possibly in the form of foreigners’ access to the 
complex Japanese retail network) being a cause of slow growth of Japanese imports. The Japanese GDP growth 
was, if anything, faster than that in the competitor countries.  This factor should have increased the rate of 
 14 
 
East Asian countries’ selective openness is indicated not just by their being open to exports 
but not imports; in a number of other relevant spheres also a similar policy was adopted.  As 
is widely acknowledged both Korea and Japan during their high-growth phases discouraged 
foreign direct investment.  This didn’t mean that they were averse to technical change but 
rather that they thought that foreign direct investment was more expensive than licensing or 
other means of obtaining technology from abroad.  So the two countries were more open to 
imports of technology through scientific and technical interchange and through licensing than 
through FDI. 
 
The widely used policy of selective economic openness which the East Asian countries 
followed with spectacular results has been conceptualized by Chakravarty and Singh in the 
following terms.  They suggest that economic openness is a multi-dimensional concept.  A 
country can be open, or not so open, with respect to trade, to finance, to migration, to 
educational, scientific and cultural exchange.  There is no economic theory that suggests that 
a country needs to be open in all dimensions at all times.  A policy of strategic openness 
enables a nation to be open in areas where it is in its interest to do so.  The optimal degree of 
economic openness will vary between countries depending on their previous history, level of 
economic development, the size of the country, their institutional development and on the 
nature of its comparative and competitive advantage. 
 
A striking feature of the WTO multilateral regime is that it does not generally permit the kind 
of diversity in international economic arrangements between countries which would be 
required if each country were to have its own optimal degree of openness.  Under the “single 
undertaking” arrangement developing countries cannot opt out of some disciplines while 
accepting others: the Agreements as a whole have to be accepted by members.  Although 
some concessions are given to developing countries under S&DT they tend to be grossly 
inadequate and basically the same rules apply to countries at widely different levels of 
economic development and with widely different capabilities. Such rules are prima facie 
unfair and unjust, and, as we shall see below, also anti-development.  
                                                                                                                                                        
growth and the level of imports and not lowered it.  For a fuller discussion of these issues see further Singh 
(1995b) and Johnson et al. (1989). 
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b. Economic openness and the experience of China, India and other emerging 
countries. 
 
Some of the fastest growing economies in the world for the last two decades have been the 
world’s most populous as well as amongst the world’s poorest countries, namely India and 
China.  The IFIs regularly claim credit for this fast economic growth on the basis of the 
alleged openness of the two countries to the world economy.  Openness is measured here in 
terms of the rate of growth of exports and imports.  It is argued that the fast economic growth 
in the two countries is due to their high rate of growth of trade, and that in the case of China, 
is also caused by FDI of which China has been a major recipient. 
 
There are, however, important difficulties with this line of reasoning.  Firstly, it is not correct 
to infer openness from just the rate of growth of trade.  This is because the growth of this 
variable does not just depend on import and export restrictions but also on the size of GDP 
and its rate of growth.  Thus the causation could easily be the other way around:  the faster 
the growth of GDP, the faster the growth of imports and exports. 
 
Apart from the question of causation, to which we shall return soon in another context, the 
Indian and Chinese story does not support the claims of the IFIs and kindred globalisers in 
other respects as well.  The Indian growth rate began to pick up in the 1980s whereas most of 
the “openness” reforms were not carried out until the early 1990s.  Similarly, both China and 
India, despite their fast growth of exports and imports, continued to have extensive import 
controls and capital controls, not withstanding the liberalization which these countries have 
carried out over the last two decades.  Thus, India still has one of the highest rates of average 
protection in the world.  Similarly, China, while being the largest receiver of foreign direct 
investment among developing countries during the last decade, maintains a wide range of 
capital controls.
16
  Table 3 provides information on the relative openness of capital account 
regimes in China, India and other selected DCs and ACs. 
 
 
                                                 
16
 See further Rodrik(2001) 
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Table 3.  Financial Openness in Selected Developed and Developing Countries, 1997 
Country    Index
a
  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Open
b 
Argentina    1.78 
Australia    1.77 
Canada    1.92  
Egypt     1.81 
France     1.73 
Japan     1.73 
Mexico    1.69 
Sweden    1.86 
United Kingdom   1.86 
United States    1.85 
 
Largely open
c 
 
Croatia    1.54 
Honduras    1.56 
Philippines    1.59 
Turkey     1.52 
 
Partially closed
d 
 
Chile     1.43 
China     1.37 
Czech Republic   1.48 
Ghana     1.43 
Indonesia    1.46 
Korea, Republic of   1.42 
Mozambique    1.41 
Russian Federation   1.43 
South Africa    1.44 
Thailand    1.46 
 
Largely closed
e 
 
Brazil     1.19 
Ethiopia    1.12 
India     1.20 
Malaysia    1.34 
Pakistan    1.31 
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a.  The Financial Openness Index scoring draws on the methodology originally developed by 
Quinn and Inclan (1997), and is based on information contained in IMF, Annual Report on 
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, 1998. 
b.  Open:  Little or no regulation for outward or inward transactions, with a generally 
nondiscriminatory environment. 
c.  Largely open:  Some regulations are exercised on outward and inward transactions 
requiring documentary support but not governmental approval. 
d.  Partially closed:  Regulation with governmental approval required for outward and inward 
transactions and usually granted. 
e.  Largely closed:  Substantial restrictions, with governmental approval required but seldom 
granted for outward and inward transactions. 
 
Source: Dailami, M. (2000) “Managing Risks of Global Financial Market Integration”, in 
Managing Financial and Corporate Distress: Lessons from Asia. Adams, C., R.E. Litan, and 
M.Pomerleano (eds.) Brookings Institutions Press, Washington, DC. pp. 458. 
  
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Apart from India and China, the case of Latin America is also relevant to the debate about the 
virtues of a free multilateral trading system versus those of selected economic openness,  as 
well as to the broader discussion of the role of the state in the economy. The facts are that the 
Latin American countries from the end of the Second World War to 1980 generally followed 
dirigist and import substitution policies. However following the debt crisis in the 1980s they 
were persuaded by the international financial institutions (IFIS) to bring about a fundamental 
change and to adopt instead Washington Consensus policies of privatization, de-regulation, 
trade and financial liberalization
17
. However these policies have not worked.  The long-term 
trend rate of growth in Latin American countries during the last fifteen years is half that these 
                                                 
17
 The IFIs ascribed the debt crisis to macro-economic mistakes of the Latin American governments and to their 
microeconomic inefficiencies, rent seeking and inappropriate resource allocation.  The latter were thought to 
arise from import substitution and the pervasive role of the state in the economy. Singh 1993, Taylor 1988, and  
Fishlow 1991, strongly contested this thesis. They pointed out that the debt crisis was due to international 
economic forces over which developing countries had no control. It was noted that the financial contagion 
played a major role in the debt crisis. It was also observed that Brazil had a debt crisis even though it had better 
fundamentals than Korea and Korea did not have such a crisis. Williamson 1985 suggested that if Korea had 
been a Latin American country it too would have succumbed to the contagion.  
 18 
countries recorded during the bad old days of import substitution and interventionist 
industrial policy!. In the wake of the Latin American experience under the Washington 
Consensus policies it is widely acknowledged that the liberalization of trade and capital 
movements does not by itself lead to long-term economic growth.   
 
An important lesson from the experience of the Latin American countries during dirigist 
period and the East Asian countries (examined earlier) is that since developing countries have 
incomplete and missing markets, the state can play an important role in coordinating 
investment activity of firms through a robust industrial policy.  It can also help build the 
capabilities of domestic firms and enterprises until they are ready to compete in the world 
markets. Amsden (2001) however, suggests that state directed industrial policies have been 
successful only in those countries where the state has certain autonomy and has been able to 
set performance standards for the private sector in return for state aid. Many of the standards 
which developing countries have successfully used, for example, those relating to domestic 
content requirements and export targets have unfortunately been specifically prohibited under 
the WTO Agreements. These prohibitions add to the disadvantages of developing countries. 
 
 Finally and briefly we turn to African countries. Broadly speaking the experience of African 
countries who have followed the liberalization policies under structural adjustment, has been 
if anything even worse than that of Latin America.  Many of these countries have long been 
under the IFI structural adjustment programmes but these have not led to sustainable long-
term economic development. 
 
V Econometric evidence on trade liberalization and long-term economic growth. 
 
There is a large literature which attempts to establish the nature of the causal relationship 
between trade liberalization and long-term economic growth.  The literature is vast and 
highly contentious. However, it has been recently comprehensively reviewed by Rodriguez 
and Rodrik (1999).  The two authors have analyzed some of the leading studies on the subject 
which have purported to show that trade liberalization causes long-term economic growth. 
Rodriquez and Rodrik’s analysis indicates that the results of these studies are not at all robust 
and are indeed quite shaky.  One general fault they find in this research is that openness is not 
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measured directly but by a number of proxies, many of which are quite unsuitable.  
Specifically, measuring the degree of openness by a variable such as black-market premium 
(see the study of Sachs and Warner (1995)) is not legitimate.  Black-market premia reflect 
more the macro-economic disequilibria in the economy rather than how open the trade 
regime is.   
 
Dollar and Kraay’s (2000) influential study which purports to find a positive relationship 
between trade liberalization and economic growth is subject to some of the same limitations 
as Rodriguez and Rodrik found in the earlier studies they analyzed.  Dollar and Kraay 
measure openness by the growth of exports and imports rather than by the country’s 
commercial policy.  India, in this analysis, comes out as a liberalizer even though, as noted 
earlier, it has the highest average rate of protection in the world. 
 
Rodriguez and Rodrik’s other relevant result in the context of this paper is that trade 
liberalization does not lead to convergence but rather to divergence between countries
18
. 
 
VI The Experience of Advanced Countries in the Golden Age 1950 - 1973:  S&DT 
on a Grand Scale.
19
 
 
In the debate on S&DT it is usually forgotten that European economic recovery and 
prosperity following the end of the Second World War depended to a large degree on what 
can only be called special and differential treatment accorded by the United States to 
Germany, Italy, Japan and other defeated as well as victor countries.  The period 1950 to 
1973 is rightly regarded as the Golden Age of world capitalism, for during this period the 
OECD economy grew at twice its historic trend rate over the last two centuries.  Research 
suggests that an important element in this extraordinary epoch  in economic history was the 
far-sighted international economic policies pursued by the United States.  Analysis and 
evidence indicate that the United States, confronted with the challenge of a triumphant Soviet 
Union at the end of the war, adopted for strategic reasons long-term economic policies 
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 For other important contributions to the debate about the relationship between trade and economic growth see 
Bhagwati and Srinivasan(1999) and Rodrik(1999). 
19
 For a further analysis of the issues raised in this section see Glyn et al (1990) and Kindleberger (1992). 
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designed to build up fast the economies of western countries so that they would not fall under 
Soviet influence.  The net result was not only the Marshall Plan for Europe but also non-
reciprocity in relation to U.S. trade with the other now advanced countries.  As Spero (1977) 
notes: 
 
In the short-term, it [the U.S.] dealt with its own huge balance-of-trade surplus 
and the European and Japanese deficits by foreign aid and military 
expenditures.  In addition the United States abandoned the Bretton Woods goal 
of convertibility and encouraged European and Japanese trade protectionism 
and discrimination against the dollar.  For example, the United States 
absorbed large volumes of Japanese exports while accepting Japanese 
restrictions against American exports.  It supported the European Payments 
Union, an intra European clearing system which discriminated against the 
dollar.  And it promoted European and Japanese exports to the United 
States…To encourage long-term adjustment, the United States promoted 
European and Japanese trade competitiveness.  Policies for economic controls 
on the defeated Axis countries were scrapped.  Aid to Europe and Japan was 
designed to rebuild productive and export capacity.  In the long run it was 
expected that such European and Japanese recovery would benefit the United 
States by widening markets for American exports.   (Spero (1977) p.37) 
(emphasis added). 
 
The challenge for the international community today is whether the advanced countries are 
willing to follow enlightened long-term international economic policies similar to those 
pioneered by the United States in the Golden Age.  These policies were evidently highly 
successful both for the U.S. and its allies and led ultimately to the demise of the Soviet 
Union.  The important issue is whether advanced countries, not faced with a strategic threat 
from another superpower are willing voluntarily to sacrifice short-term and transient trade 
advantages for long-term economic policy that would benefit developing countries as well as 
themselves. 
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VII The Case for Special and differential Treatment for Developing Countries and 
the Multilateral Trading System:  A Preliminary Summary. 
 
The analysis of the previous sections has indicated that simply integrating developing 
countries with varying degrees of economic weaknesses in a multilateral world trading 
system is unlikely to lead by itself to economic development.  Evidence from the 
developmental experience of various countries during the last half century or more, as well as 
economic analysis, suggest that the optimal degree of openness from the perspective of 
economic development varies between countries.  Moreover, as Rodrik rightly argues, 
capitalism may be the only viable system in the world, but a wide variety of institutional 
arrangements are compatible with capitalism.  To bring about sustainable economic 
development, developing countries need to have policy autonomy so that they can create their 
own institutions best suited to their needs.  This type of choice is precisely what effectively 
becomes seriously circumscribed under the multilateral trading arrangements of the WTO.
20
 
 
Equally importantly, developing countries are unable to employ the variety of policy 
instruments used effectively as seen above by both developing and developed countries 
during the post world war II period to enhance their economic development. These notably 
include industrial policies employed in many Asian countries with outstanding results. These 
restrictions on government policy space under the WTO Agreements might not be regarded 
as a handicap if it is maintained that in most developing countries government failure is more 
important than market failure and so countries are better off in a regime where their 
governments cannot intervene. This may appear to be a plausible argument but one which 
flies in the face of evidence. Governments in China, India, Mexico, Brazil, Korea, Taiwan, 
Malaysia and in many other developing countries have long overall records of successful 
government interventions, poverty reduction and economic development.
21
 These countries 
have effective governments which are involved in carrying out myriad developmental tasks. 
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 Strictly speaking, WTO Agreements do not prohibit establishing new institutions as such.  What these do is to 
place limitations on a country’s policies and legal framework.  The latter are compatible with some institutional 
arrangements and not with others which unnecessarily restricts many DC’s policy autonomy and their ability to 
establish important development friendly institutions. 
21
  See further Amsden (2001), for a discussion of why in some countries government interventions succeed  and 
in other they do not . 
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At a developmental level Uruguay Round Agreements establishing the WTO Agreements 
have arguably been a colossal mistake.  Rodrik is rightly scathing in his indictment: 
 
The rules for admission into the world economy not only reflect little awareness 
of development priorities they are often completely unrelated to sensible 
economic principles.  WTO rules on anti-dumping, subsidies and countervailing 
measures, agriculture, textiles, trade related investment measures (TRIMS) and 
trade related intellectual property rights (TRIPS) are utterly devoid of any 
economic rationale beyond the mercantilist interests of a narrow set of powerful 
groups in the advanced industrial countries.  The developmental pay-off of most 
of these requirements is hard to see.  Rodrik (2001) p.27. 
 
Moreover, developing countries had to pay heavily for the privilege of joining this anti-
development club.  World Bank (2002) estimates that it costs a typical developing 
country $US1.5 million in start up costs and $US2 million in annual recurrent costs to 
implement a single WTO agreement, namely the TRIPs. These expenses are onerous for 
many developing countries.  
 
Developing countries signed up to WTO agreements on which they were evidently not 
properly consulted. The implications of the Agreements for economic development 
were not spelled out. The euphoria of developing countries over the demand for the 
New International Economic Order in the 1970s had given way in the 1980s to a debt 
crisis in Latin America and Africa which reduced many of these countries to the status 
of being supplicants before the International Financial Institutions.  The political 
weaknesses of developing countries were also noted earlier. These, plus the pressure 
from IFIs under the structural adjustment programs, obliged these countries to accept 
what many of them knew to be development unfriendly Agreements.   
 
At a global level it is important to note that developing countries already suffer from an 
additional structural handicap compared with the pre-globalization period.  In part as a 
consequence of trade liberalization and lowered tariffs on imported foreign consumer goods, 
research indicates that developing countries are experiencing surges in imports.  This results 
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in their becoming balance of payments constrained at a systematically slower growth rate 
than used to be the case before.
22
 To finance their current account deficits, countries often 
open up their capital account.  This perhaps helps in the short term but over the medium term 
many countries have unhappy results with these capital accounts openings.  (The latter issue 
is discussed further below.) 
 
Significantly, the current account disequilibria of the kind outlined above can be rectified in 
other ways, without resorting to premature capital account liberalization and risking financial 
fragility. One important trade-as well as-development friendly way to do this would be to 
allow DCs again a balance of payments let-out clause (as in GATT)  which would permit 
them to control directly  the level and growth rate of their imports (including using 
quantitative controls if necessary).   Permitting DCs this additional measure of economic 
autonomy would mean that the affected country does not necessarily have to reduce its level 
or its rate of growth of GDP, in order to reduce the level and the growth rates of imports. 
S&DT provisions of this kind in favour of DCs would thus benefit both the North and the 
South by reducing the costs of adjustments of temporary balance of payments disequilibria.  
 
To sum up, in view of the evident anti-development bias of the many WTO Agreements, a 
very large degree of special and differential treatment would be needed to redress the 
balance. There is ample historical evidence, not least from developed countries themselves 
that a reasonably high and predictable degree of special and differential treatment can assist 
economic development.  Such S&DT could also be in the long-term interest of developed 
countries as outlined below. This is in part because a prosperous developing world provides a 
greater market for advanced country goods which in turn leads to higher incomes and 
production in the North.  This generates a greater demand for imports from the South, a 
positive feedback loop and a virtuous circle of cumulative causation and higher incomes in 
both North and South than would otherwise be the case.  However, the resulting growth path 
is unstable, implying a fragility of the positive feedback loop.  The latter could easily go into 
reverse in a vicious circle if, for example, higher incomes in both regions lead to an increase 
in commodity prices, or there is a wage-price spiral in the labour markets in the North.  To 
avoid this vicious circle, it will be necessary to establish long-term restraining institutions, 
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both nationally (e.g. pay co-ordination policies) and internationally (e.g. commodity price 
stabilization policies) to deliver mutually supportive fast economic growth in both the North 
and the South, as occurred in the Golden Age.
23
 
 
 
VIII  Graduation and Differentiation:  a Mercantilist misconception 
 
A second main area of contention between ACs and DCs concerns the question of graduation 
and differentiation in relation to S&DT. It was suggested above that the optimal degree of 
openness differs between countries, developing and developed, as well as within each of 
these country groups. In terms of the application of S&DT to DCs that would suggest a case 
by case approach to each country. This would however at the present stage of development of 
the multilateral trading system be extremely expensive in terms of either trust or in more 
orthodox financial terms of costs and is therefore likely to be impractical. Hence the South 
view that all DCs should benefit from S&DT and there should be no “graduation”. The 
significant issue here, which may help towards a resolution of this controversy, concerns how 
much extra costs if any, would developed countries have to bear if the S&DT provisions were 
not confined to least developed countries but were given to all developing countries. Would 
the costs of greater universality of S&DT provisions be prohibitively high for developed 
countries? 
 
In a recent important World Bank study (Hoekman et al., 2003) on the S&DT controversy, 
the distinguished authors argue: “Defining (agreeing to) the criteria to determine eligibility 
for S&DT lies at the heart of the S&DT debate. The experience to date suggests that the 
depth of the differential treatment granted will be inversely related to the number of eligible 
countries. Eligibility for S&DT should be restricted to fewer WTO member countries than is 
currently the case under the self-declaration approach that is used to identify developing 
countries.” The authors however, do not provide any economic justification for their 
advocacy of selection rather than universality in the granting of S&DT treatments to DCs. 
Yet, this issue is central to the dispute. For if the cost of universality were zero or negative or 
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 For a more comprehensive discussion of these issues see Kaldor’s (1978) classic paper,  Singh (1995a) and 
Singh and Zammit (2000). 
 25 
even a positive number which was small, it would be difficult to maintain a case for 
selectivity in favour of simply the Least Developed Countries and small number of other 
similar countries, as suggested by Hoekman et al., 2003. For if universality has no net 
economic cost to the ACs, their insistence on selectivity would be regarded by DCs as simply 
a political device to create divisions among their ranks. 
 
 It is therefore, important in relation to the “graduation” issue to estimate the net costs and 
benefits to ACs of the international trading system which up to now has been mainly working 
on a universalist criterion of self-declaration as a DC in relation to S&DT matters.
24
  There 
are no studies which directly compare a universalist S&DT regime with a selective one. 
There is nevertheless, a large body of analysis and indirect evidence which bears on the issue 
of the costs and benefits of the present trading system to ACs. The relevant parts of this 
literature
25
 concerns the effects of North South trade in manufacture on labour market 
outcomes (in terms of unemployment, wage dispersion and de-industrialization) in the North. 
This literature is highly contentious, albeit more in terms of methodology than with respect to 
the results. Until recently, the general empirical conclusion of this body of research wars that 
the ACs manufacturing trade with DCs during the 1980s was responsible for about 20% of 
the observed wage dispersion in the US. It was also thought to contribute to de-
industrialization and unemployment on a similar modest scale.
26
 Most of the observed 
negative changes in the labour market outcomes in the North have been ascribed to 
technology.  
 
 Most researchers accept the view that the proximate cause of labour market outcomes in the 
North, is the fall in the demand for un-skilled labour which is ascribed to either trade or 
technology. Prof. Sir Tony Atkinson (1999, 2000, 2001) refers to this common view as the 
transatlantic consensus, since it provides a unified explanation for both unemployment in 
Western Europe and inequality in income distribution in the US. It does so by making the 
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 For recent review of this literature see Slaughter and Swagel (1997), Atkinson (1999, 2000, 2001), Singh 
(2003a), Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997). 
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auxiliary assumption that labour markets in Western Europe are highly imperfect because of 
the welfare state, so that reduced demand for unskilled labour leads to unemployment rather 
than reduced wages. However in the US, the flexible labour market prevents unemployment 
at the expense of unfavourable changes in wage distribution. 
 
Be that as it may, the most recent research on the subject which covers the data for   the 
1990s produces radically different conclusions. It suggests that neither trade nor technology 
can explain the observed changes, either in income distribution in the US or in 
unemployment in Europe. Macroeconomic factors, unionisation and variables such as social 
norms have been deemed to be more important than either trade or technology, in explaining 
the observed changes in the 1990s. 
 
Equally significantly, empirical studies of the effects of trade and technology on AC labour 
markets, do not take into account changes in terms of trade, which are connected with the 
trade with the South and which have a highly positive effect on the welfare in the North. To 
illustrate, the large devaluations that occurred in the crisis affected Asian countries as a 
consequence of the acute macro-economic disturbances in the region in the 1997 to 2000, did 
not cause serious difficulties for US industry as was expected. Instead, improvements in 
terms of trade helped reduce inflation in the US which enabled the Federal Reserve to run the 
economy at a higher level of output and employment than would otherwise have been the 
case. 
 
The above analysis suggests that, provided import surges can be controlled by multilaterally 
agreed safeguard measures, there are unlikely to be significant net economic costs to ACs of 
allowing a universalist S&DT regime in DCs. In view of this, it is not surprising that the DCs 
view the AC emphasis on graduation and differentiation as being politically motivated and 
designed to create further divisions among the DCs.  Since there is a vast gap between 
countries in their relative political and economic strengths, more divisions among developing 
countries would further reduce their bargaining power in a uni-polar world, and lead to even 
greater imbalances between the North and the South. 
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To sum up, the North’s insistence on graduation and differentiation is a mercantilist 
misconception from which it needs to be weaned away, so that attention can be focused on 
the real and substantive issues of the kinds of S&DT which would best help emerging 
countries.  
 
 
 
 
IX   Conclusion: S&DT and Economic Development 
The unequivocal endorsement of S&DT at Doha gave the international community a fresh 
chance to change course, to put economic development at the heart of the agenda for the 
current and future evolution of the multilateral trading system. In operational terms this 
would indicate not only that internationally agreed poverty reduction goals are met, but that a 
movement towards convergence in income and productivity levels with rich countries is 
regarded as a legitimate objective which poor countries shall have the right, and be provided 
with the opportunity and the ability to pursue. Taking development goals seriously in this 
manner would require a new definition and a new conceptualization of S&DT than the 
narrow meaning given to it under the Uruguay Round and the WTO Agreements. This new 
conceptualization of S&DT should satisfy the following broad concerns of DCs. 
 
(a) There are parts of WTO Agreements which do not advance the cause of 
development and, arguably, restrict it. Reference here is to TRIMs, TRIPs, 
Subsidies and Countervailing Duties, Anti-dumping and other similar measures
27
. 
These Agreements need to be re-negotiated and, if they cannot be satisfactorily 
amended developing countries should have the right to opt out of these. Indeed, 
what is being suggested here is that in terms of Hoekman et al(2003) developing 
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countries should be allowed to indulge in the cardinal sin of participating in the 
multilateral trading system on the basis of ‘GATT a la carte’ as it were. 
 
(b) Not only is it necessary to recognize the imbalances and anti-development 
character of the existing WTO Agreements but, equally importantly it is essential 
to ensure that S&DT of DCs is made a part and parcel of the liberalization of 
Services and of other areas, as well as in the consideration of new disciplines (eg. 
the Singapore issues) on which negotiations are taking place now or are likely in 
the foreseeable  future. Again if DCs concerns on these issues cannot be met 
within the framework of existing Agreements they should be permitted to opt out. 
 
The achievement of (a) and (b) above depends on the ACs being weaned away from their 
insistence on graduation and differentiation, which this paper has argued is a mercantilist 
misconception. Indeed, this entire programme of putting development at the centre stage in 
WTO negotiations requires a sea change in the culture and conduct of such negotiations 
which at present appears to be steeped in narrow mercantilism rather than any long-term 
vision of a trading system which benefits both rich and poor countries. The AC negotiators 
should not forget that trade is not a zero sum game, and their countries themselves provide an 
outstanding example of the success of non-reciprocity in international trade and finance. As 
suggested in Part I of the paper in the golden Age 1950-73 the far sighted  economic policies 
of the US which sought long-term objectives rather than short-term gains were spectacularly 
successful in building up most of Europe and Japan as show pieces of liberal capitalism. 
 
The challenge ACs face today is whether they are willing to take a similar long term view in 
their trade and financial relationships with developing countries and whether or not they will  
be able to overcome the narrow mercantilist outlook which demands reciprocity. The ball is 
 29 
squarely in the court of the ACs as only they have the economic power to determine the 
world economic priorities and agenda. 
 30 
Bibliography 
 
 
Amsden, A.  (1989) Asia’s Next Giant , New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Amsden, A.  (1994) Why isn’t the Whole World Experimenting with the East Asian 
model to Develop? World Development, Vol.22, No.4. 
 
Amsden, A. (2001) The Rise of the “The Rest” Challenges to the West from Late-
Industrializing Economies. Oxford University Press. 
 
Amsden, A. H., and A. Singh (1994) The Optimal Degree of Competition and Dynamic 
Efficiency in Japan and Korea, European Economic Review, Vol.38, No. ¾ (April), pp. 
941-951. 
 
Arrow, K. (1962) The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing, Review of Economic 
Studies, pp 155-73. 
 
Atkinson, A.B. (1999) ‘Is Rising Inequality Inevitable?  A Critique of the Transatlantic 
Consensus’, WIDER Annual Lectures 3.  World Institute for Development Economics 
Research, The United Nations University. 
 
Atkinson, A.B. (2000) The Changing Distribution of Income:  Evidence and 
Explanations, German Economic Review, Vol. 1. 
 
Atkinson, A.B. (2001) A Critique of the Transatlantic Consensus on Rising Income 
Inequality, The World Economy, Vol. 24, Issue 4, pp. 433-452. 
 
Caves, R., and M. Uekusa (1976) Industrial Organization in Japan (Washington, DC: 
The Brookings Institution). 
 
CEPG (Cambridge Economic Policy Group) (1979), Economic Policy Review, No. 5. 
 
Chakravarty, S., and A. Singh (1988) The Desirable Forms of Economic Openness in the 
South (Helsinki: WIDER) 
 
Chang, H.J. (1994) The Political Economy of Industrial Policy (London: Macmillan). 
 
Dailami, M. (2000) “Managing Risks of Global Financial Market Integration”, in 
Managing Financial and Corporate Distress: Lessons from Asia. Adams, C., R.E. Litan, 
and M.Pomerleano (eds.) Brookings Institutions Press, Washington, DC. pp. 447-480. 
 
Dixit, A., and J.E. Stiglitz (1977) Monopolistic Competition and Optimal Product 
Diversity, American Economic Review, Vol. 67, pp 297-308. 
 
Dollar, David and Aart Kraay (2000).  ‘Trade, Growth, and Poverty’, World Bank, 
Washington, DC, October. 
 31 
 
Dooley, M., and Frankel, J.A. (eds) (2002) Managing Currency Crises in Emerging 
Markets, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
 
Edwards, S. and Frankel, J.A. (eds) (2002)  Preventing Currency Crises in Emerging 
Markets,  The University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
 
Feldstein, M. (2002) Economic and Financial Crisis in emerging Market Economies: 
Overview of Prevention and Management, NBER Working Paper Series, Working Paper 
8837, Cambridge, MA. 
 
Fishlow, A. (1991) Some Reflections on Comparative Latin American  Economic 
Performance and Policy, in T.Banuri (ed.) Economic Liberalisation: No Panacea 
(Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press) 
 
Freeman, C. (1989) New Technology and Catching Up, The European Journal of 
Development Research (London: Frank Cass) Vol.1, No.1. 
 
GATT (1986) The Text of the General Agreement (Geneva: GATT):7 
 
Glyn, A., A. Hughes, A. Lipietz and A. Singh (1990) The rise and fall of the golden age, 
in S. Marglin and J. Schor (eds.), The Golden Age of Capitalism (Oxford, UK: Clarendon 
Press). 
 
Gomery R.E., and W.J. Baumol, (2000) Global Trade and Conflicting National Interest. 
MIT Press, Cambridge Massachusetts. 
 
Gottschalk, P. and Smeeding, T. (1997) ‘Cross National Comparisons of Earnings and 
Income Inequality’ Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 35, No. 2, pp. 633-87. 
 
Hoekman, B, Messerlin P, Michalopoulos, C., Pangestu, M., Saggi, K., Tybout, J., 
Winters, A. ‘Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller 
Participation of Developing Countries:  Objectives, Instruments and Options for the 
WTO’ Paper presented at DFID Special and Differential Treatment Seminar, March 2003, 
London. 
 
IMF (1997)  World Economic Outlook: Interim Assessment. Washington DC, IMF 
(December) 
 
Johnson. C., L. Tyson and J. Zysman (1989) Politics and Productivity (New York: Harper 
Business). 
 
Kaldor, N. (1978) Further essays on Economic Theory. London: Duckworth. 
 
Kindleberger, C. (1992) Why did the golden age last so long?, in F. Cairncross and A. 
Cairncross (eds.), The Legacy of the Golden Age (London and New York: Routledge), 
pp.15-44. 
 32 
 
Krugman, P. (1987) Is Free Trade Passé? , Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol.1, 
No.2,131-143. 
 
Lall, S. (1995) Industrial Strategy and Policies on Foreign Direct Investment in East Asia. 
Transnational Corporations, 4(3), December. 
 
Melamed, C. (2003) Doing “Development” at the WTO: The Doha Round and Special 
and Differential Treatment.  Paper presented in DFID Special and Differential Treatment 
Seminar on 7 March 2003, at Church House, London. 
 
Ocampo, J.A., and L. Taylor (2000) Trade Liberalization in Developing Economies: 
Modest Benefits but Problems with Productivity Growth, Macro Prices, and Income 
Distribution. In Controversies in Macroeconomics Growth, Trade and Policy, Huw David 
Dixon (ed.) Massachusetts: Blackwell. 
 
Okimoto, D.I. (1989) Between the MITI and the Market (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford 
University Press). 
 
OXFAM (2002), Rugged Rules and Double Standards:  Trade, Globalization, and the 
Fight Against Poverty. 
 
Prowse, Susan (2002) ‘The Role of International and National Agencies in Trade-related 
Capacity Building;, The World Economy, Vol 25, No. 9, September 2002. 
 
Quinn, D., and C. Inclan (1997) The Origins of Financial Openness: A Study of Current 
of Capital Account Liberalization. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 41 (July), 
771-813. 
 
Rodriguez, F., and D. Rodrik (1999) trade Policy and Economic Growth: A Sceptic guide 
to the Cross-National Evidence, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge: 
Mass., April 1999. 
 
Ricupero, R. (2000) Rebuilding confidence in the multilateral trading system: Closing the 
“legitimacy gap”, UNCTAD. 
 
Rodrik, D. (1999)  The New Global Economy and the Developing Countries:  Making 
Openness Work, Overseas Development Council, Washington, DC, 1999. 
 
Rodrik, D. (2001) The Global Governance of trade as if Development Really Mattered, 
United nations Development Programme (UNDP). 
 
Sachs, J., and A. Warner (1995) Economic Reform and the Process of Global Integration, 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, No.1:1-118. 
 
 33 
Singh, A. (1993) Asian Economic Success and Latin American Failure in the 1980s: New 
Analyses and Future Policy Implications. International Review of Applied Economics, 
Vol7, No.3, pp.267-289. 
 
Singh, A. (1994) Openness and the market-friendly Approach to Development: Learning 
the Right Lessons from Development Experience. World Development, Vol.22, No.12. 
December. 
 
Singh, A. (1995a) Institutional requirements for full employment in advanced economies, 
International Labour Review, Vol. 135, No. 4-5. 
 
Singh, A. (1995b) The Causes of Fast Economic Growth in East Asia, United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva. 
 
Singh, A.  (1995c)  Review of Wood, Adrian (1994), ‘North-South Trade, Employment 
and Inequality’, Economic Journal, September 1995, Vol. 105, No. 432, pp. 1287-1289. 
 
Singh, A. (1997) Catching up with the West: A Perspective on Asian Economic 
Development and Lessons for Latin America, in Emmerij, L. (ed.) Economic and Social 
Development into the XXI Century. Published by the Inter-American Development Bank, 
distributed by The Johns Hopkins University Press, Washington, D.C. pp.222- 272. 
 
Singh, A. (1998) Savings, Investments and the Corporations in the East Asian Miracle, 
The Journal of Development Studies. Vol. 34, No.6, pp 112-137. 
 
Singh, A. (2003a) ‘Income Inequality in Advanced Economies:  A Critical Examination 
of Trade and Technology Theories and an Alternative Perspective’ in Ghosh, J and C.P. 
Chandrasekhar (eds) Work and Well-Being in the Age of Finance. Muttukadu Papers 1.  
Tulia Books, New Delhi. 
 
Singh, A. (2003b), ‘Elements for a New Paradigm on Special and Differential Treatment: 
Special and Differential Treatment, the Multilateral Trading System and Economic 
Development in the 21
st
 Century’, http://www.ictsd.org/dlogue/2003-05-
06/Singh_S&DT_final.pdf 
 
Singh, A. (2005), ‘Special and Differential Treatment: The Multilateral Trading System 
and Economic Development in the Twenty-first Century’, in Gallaher,K. P.(ed.) Putting 
Development First, Zed Books, London and New York 
 
Singh, A., and B. Weisse (1999) The Asian Model: A Crisis Foretold. International 
Social Science Journal; 203-215. 
 
Singh, A. and A. Zammit (2000).  The Global Labour Standards Controversy:  Critical 
Issues for Developing Countries.  South Perspectives,  South Centre, Geneva. 
 
Slaughter, M. and P. Swagel (1997) ‘Does Globalization Lower Wages and Export Jobs?’ 
Economic Issues Series No. 11, IMF:  Washington, DC. 
 34 
 
Srinivasan, T.N., and J. Bhagwati (1999) Outward-orientation and Development: Are 
revisionists right? Economic Growth Centre Discussion Paper, 806. New Haven, CT, 
Yale University, September. 
 
Spero, J.E. (1977) The Politics of International Economic Relations, London, George 
Allen and Unwin. 
 
Summers, L.H. (1998) Opportunities out of Crisis: Lessons from Asia. Remarks to the 
Overseas Development Council, From the Office of Public Affairs, March 19, 1998. 
 
Taylor, L.  (1988) Varieties of Stabilisation Experiences, Oxford University press, oxford, 
1988. 
 
Third World Network (2001) The Multilateral Trading System: A Development 
Perspective. Third World Network. UNDP, Background Paper. 
 
Tsuru, S. (1993) Japan’s Capitalism; Creative Defeat and Beyond (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press). 
 
UNCTAD (2000) Trade and Development Report, 2000. United nations, new York and 
Geneva, 2000. 
 
Williamson, J. (1985) Comment on Sachs. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, No.2. 
 
World Bank (1991) World Development Report, 1991: The Challenge of Development, 
Oxford University Press, New York, 1991. 
 
World Bank (1993)  The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy, 
Oxford University Press, New York, 1993. 
 
World Bank (2002) Building Institutions for Markets, World Development Report 2002. 
The World Bank, Washington, DC. 
 
WTO (1995) Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, WTO Information 
and Media Relations Divisions, Geneva. http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-
wto.pdf. 
 
You, J. I., and H.J. Chang (1993) The myth of free labour market in Korea, Contributions 
to Political Economy, Vol. 12. 
 
Young, A.A. (1928) Increasing Returns and Economic Progress, Economic Journal, Vol. 
38, pp 527-42. 
 
  
  
